The Limits of Modeling by Podnieks, Karlis




Abstract.  First,  I propose a new argument in favor 
of  the  Dappled  World  perspective  introduced  by 
Nancy  Cartwright.  There  are  systems,  for  which 
detailed models can't exist in the natural world. And 
this has nothing to do with the limitations of human 
minds or technical resources.  The limitation is built  
into the very principle of modeling: we are trying to 
replace some system by another one. In full detail, 
this may be impossible.
Secondly,  I'm trying  to  refine  the  Dappled  World 
perspective  by  applying  the  correct  distinction 
between models and theories. At the level of models, 
because of the above-mentioned limitations, we will 
always have only a patchwork of models each very 
restricted in its application scope. And at the level of  
theories,  we  will  never  have  a  single  complete 
Theory of  Everything  (or,  a  complete  pyramid  of 
theories) allowing,  without additional postulates, to 
generate all the models we may need for surviving in 
this world.
Keywords:  models  and  theories,  model  templates, 
models in statistical physics, simulation.
This  article  is  written  from  an  anti-Platonist 
point of view.
The Dappled World perspective was introduced 
by  Nancy  Cartwright (1999:  The  Dappled 
World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 1): “... we live 
in a world rich in different things, with different 
natures,  behaving  in  different  ways.  The  laws 
that describe this world are a patchwork, not a 
pyramid.” 
I will propose a new argument in favor of the 
Dappled  World  perspective,  and  will  try  to 
refine  it  by  applying  the  correct  distinction 
between models and theories.
What is a Model?
Surprisingly,  in  philosophical  texts,  this 
question is asked (sometimes), but almost never 
–  answered.  Instead  of  a  general  answer, 
usually,  some  classification  of  models  is 
considered.  A general  answer  can't  be  found 
even in the prominent account given by Roman 
Frigg, and Stephan Hartmann (2006: Models in 
Science.  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). 
Should  this  mean  that  a  sufficiently  general 
definition of modeling is impossible?  
Computer  scientists  are  proposing  very  broad 
definitions of modeling since many years. 
The  following  general  definition  of  the  term 
“model”  was  proposed  by  Marvin  Minsky 
(1965:  Matter,  Mind and Models.  Proceedings  
of IFIP Congress 65, 1: 45-49) on p. 45: “We 
use the term "model" in the following sense: To 
an observer B, an object A* is  a model of an 
object  A to  the  extent  that  B  can  use  A*  to 
answer questions that interest him about A. The 
model relation is inherently ternary. Any attempt 
to  suppress  the  role  of  the  intentions  of  the 
investigator B leads to circular definitions or to 
ambiguities  about  "essential  features"  and  the 
like.”
A  similar  definition  was  proposed  by  Jeff 
Rothenberg (1989:  The  Nature  of  Modeling. 
Artificial  Intelligence,  Simulation,  and  
Modeling,  John Wiley and Sons,  75-92) on p. 
75: “Modeling in its broadest sense is the cost-
effective use of something in place of something 
else for some purpose.”
Among philosophers, such a broad definition of 
modeling is advocated, to my best knowledge, 
only  by  Paul  Teller (2001:  Twilight  of  the 
Perfect Model Model. Erkenntnis, 55: 393–415) 
on p.  397:  “...  in principle,  anything can be a 
model, and that what makes the thing a model is 
the  fact  that  it  is  regarded  or  used  as  a 
representation  of  something  by  the  model 
users. ... it would be a mistake for the general 
account  of  the  use  of  models  in  science  to 
specify more narrowly what can function as a 
model.”
Thus,  the  broadest  possible  definition  of 
modeling  could  sound as  follows:  a  model  is  
anything that  is  (or  could be)  used,  for  some  
purpose, in place of something else.
Could  such a  broad definition  be useful?  Can 
one derive any useful consequences from it? See 
below...
According to this definition, a model is a single  
concrete  system replacing  another  single  
concrete system. For example,  a model of the 
Solar system may include: a specified number 
of  planets  (8,  or  9),  a  specified  diameter  and 
mass of Sun (1.5 x 108 km, 2.0 x 1020 kg), and 
for each planet: specified diameter, mass, initial 
location and velocity. No satellites, no asteroids, 
no comets.  To allow computer  simulation,  the 
Newtonian mechanics with the gravitation law 
also should be included in the model as means 
of  reasoning.  The  “model”  of  an  “arbitrary” 
system of n planets, is not a model in the above 
sense (it is a model template, see below).
Theories as Means of Model-Building
None of theories is modeling a single concrete 
system. Thus, theories are not models, are they 
“nobler” than models? No,  theories are useful  
only  as  a  means  of  model-building,  no  more 
than that! Newtonian mechanics is not a model, 
but  it  allows  generating  of  models  of  various 
concrete mechanical systems. For references on 
this point see my (2009: Towards Model-Based 
Model of Cognition, The Reasoner 3(6): 5-6). 
Model Templates 
Between  models  and  theories,  there  is  an 
important  intermediate  concept  that  is  called 
model template by computer scientists. The term 
“parametric model” also would be appropriate. 
A model  template is  a  structure  containing 
parameters.  By  setting  these  parameters  to 
concrete values, we obtain models (instances of 
the template). The above-mentioned “arbitrary” 
system of  n planets is a model template having 
as parameters: n – the number of planets, D, M 
– diameter and mass of the central body, di, mi – 
diameter and mass of i-th planet etc. By setting 
these parameters appropriately (n=8 etc.) we can 
obtain, for example, the computer simulation of 
Solar system running on my laptop.
Some  theories  can  be  represented  almost 
entirely as  model  templates.  For  example,  the 
Hamiltonian  formulation  of  Newtonian 
mechanics can be regarded as a model template 
of an arbitrary mechanical system having 6n+2 
parameters: n – the number of components, H – 
Hamiltonian  function  of  the  system,  6n initial 
coordinates and velocities. Thus, some theories 
are “models” indeed – but parametric models.
The idea that some theories are, in fact, model 
templates can be found already in Ronald Giere 
(1979:  Understanding  Scientific  Reasoning, 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston). See also R. Giere 
(1985:  Constructive  Realism.  In:  Images  of  
Science:  Essays  on  Realism  and  Empiricism, 
University Of Chicago Press, 75-98), where on 
p.  78  model  templates  are  called  general  
models.
In  a  sense,  model  templates  represent  the 
“homogeneous” extreme of model-building. The 
“heterogeneous” extreme is represented by less 
organized  means  of  model-building  discussed, 
for  example,  by  Mauricio  Suarez and  Nancy 
Cartwright (2008:  Theories:  Tools  versus 
Models.  Studies  in  History and Philosophy of  
Modern Physics, 39, 62-81) on p. 79.
The Limits of Modeling 
Now,  the  main  point:  there  are  systems  that 
can't be modeled in full detail even in principle.
As  an  example,  let's  consider  an  isolated 
container  containing  one  litre  of  air.  How 
detailed can be a simulatable computer model of 
such a system? If we believe that air consists of 
molecules,  then  our  container  includes  about 
1022 molecules.  Thus,  to represent the state  of 
this system at a particular moment of time, we 
need  to  store  at  least  6  x  1022 numbers 
(coordinates and velocities). And to simulate the 
evolution  of  state  in  real  time,  we  need  to 
compute – at a very high speed – the solutions 
of  6  x  1022 Hamiltonian  equations.  We  can't 
build  such  a  computer.  Moreover  –  such   a 
computer can't exist in the natural world! And 
even  moreover:  in  the  natural  world,  two 
systems  each  consisting  of  1022 separable  
components  simply  can't  be  “isomorphic  
enough” to represent each other in every detail  
(whatever it means)!
If  the  number  1022 doesn't  seem  convincing 
enough, replace the air container by the entire 
Universe, all the photons and neutrino included. 
How  detailed  can  be  a  simulatable  computer  
model of the Universe? Could it simulate every 
photon  and  every neutrino?  Could  this  model 
include  the  model  of  the  simulating  computer 
itself?
Thus,  it  makes  sense  to  ask  the  following 
question:  for  which  values  of  N,  two  natural 
world systems each consisting of 10N separable 
components  can't  be  “isomorphic  enough”  to 
represent  each  other  in  every  detail?  My 
hypothesis: already N=22 is large enough.
Pierre Simon Laplace was aware of this problem 
in  1812:  he  concluded  that  despite  having  a 
“Theory  of  Everything”  (Newtonian 
mechanics), we will never be able to predict the 
future in every detail: “... our efforts will always 
fall infinitely short of this mark”  – an  English 
translation  from  p.  101  of  Kevin  D.  Hoover 
(2001: Causality in Macroeconomics, 311 pp.)
Thus,  there  are  systems,  for  which  detailed 
models can't exist  in the natural world. And – 
contrary to Laplace – this has nothing to do with 
the  limitations  of  human  minds  or  technical 
resources. The  limitation is built into the very  
principle of modeling: we are trying to  replace 
some system by another one. In full detail, this 
may  be  impossible.  Many  systems  are  “too 
unique” to be modeled in full detail.
This represents another argument in favor of the 
Dappled World perspective:  at the model level,  
we will always have only a patchwork of models  
each very restricted in its application scope.
But at the level of theories? Will we have, some 
time,  a  single complete  Theory of  Everything 
(or, at least, a complete pyramid of theories) not 
only “explaining everything in the world”, but 
also allowing,  without additional postulates, to 
generate  all the  models  we  may  need  for 
surviving  in  this  world?  According  to  the 
Dappled  World  perspective,  the  anwer  is 
negative.
This  represents  the refinement  of  the Dappled 
World perspective announced at the beginning.
Templates do exist, but instances don't?
Now, a possible Platonist objection: the above-
mentioned  detailed  models  of  systems 
containing   1022 separable  components  do  not 
exist in the natural world, but we can  imagine 
them!  There  are  “imagined  systems”  that 
“would be physical things if they were real” – as 
put by Roman Frigg (2010: Models and fiction, 
Synthese, 172(2), 251-268) on p. 253.
But  how  could  one  imagine  a  computer 
simulation of 1022 molecules, if such a computer 
can't  exist  in  the  natural  world  even  in 
principle? For an anti-Platonist, it means that, in 
fact, one is using some mathematical axioms to 
derive  the  “existence”  of  such  a  huge  and 
powerful  computer  (axioms  of  first  order 
arithmetic would suffice here). But many things 
the  “existence”  of  which  follows  from  your 
axioms, can't exist in the natural world. 
What  really  exists  in  the  natural  world,  are 
definitions  of  model  templates  – because  they 
can be written down on a paper. For example, 
one can write down a definition of the following 
model template: an isolated container containing 
the  so-called  hard-ball-gas having  as 
parameters:  n –  the  number  of  spherical 
molecules; dimensions of the container; and for 
each molecule:  diameter,  mass,  initial  location 
and  velocity.  The  Hamiltonian  function  is 
defined  here  as  a  simple  sum  of  kinetic  and 
potential  energies  of  molecules,  assuming 
elastic  collisions.  This  model  template written 
down on a paper exists in the natural world in 
the most solid sense possible.
But, if we set n=1022, then there is no real way 
of assigning particular values even to the initial 
coordinates  and  velocities  of  each  molecule. 
Thus, while the model template itself exists in 
the natural world, for n=1022, its instances “exist 
only  in  axioms”.  One  can  prove  general 
theorems  about  these  instances,  but  most  of 
particular instances  are  not  accessible  to 
analysis. 
What could physicists do in such a situation?
At  the  model  level,  they  can  try  computer 
simulation  only  of  very  small  models  of  gas 
containers:  for  n=103,  104 etc.  For  impressive 
educational  programs  of  this  kind  see  Paul 
Falstad (2009:  Gas Molecules Simulation) and 
John  I.  Gelder  et  al.  (2000:  Chemistry  Web 
Server).  For  a  research  application  involving 
simulation  – see  Yakov G.  Sinai et  al. (2008: 
Statistical Properties of the Cluster Dynamics of 
the  Systems  of  Statistical  Mechanics,  ESI 
Lecture  Notes  in  Mathematics  and  Physics:  
Boltzmann's  Legacy,  European  Mathematical  
Society, 203-216).
But,  perhaps,  the  most  striking  simulation 
experiment  of  this  kind  –  The  Millennium 
Simulation Project was performed by The Virgo 
Consortium.  The  simulated  Universe  of  this 
experiment consists of about 1010 big graviting 
“particles” (each about 109 solar masses in the 
first simulation, and about 107 – in the second 
one).  Trillion  times  less  details  –  when 
compared to one litre of air! 
And,  at  the  level  of  theory?  For  realistic 
numbers of molecules, most particular instances 
of  the  corresponding  model  templates  are  not 
accessible to analysis. Thus, physicists may try 
deriving only the average properties of all  (or 
most)  instances  of  these  templates.  This  is 
exactly what is going on in statistical mechanics 
(micro-canonical ensemble etc.).
One  can  obtain  some  information  about  the 
location and velocity of some particle only by 
shooting  another  particle  at  it.  At  the  micro-
level,  this  implies  the  famous  uncertainty  
principle: a micro-particle possessing a definite 
location and velocity as its “state” is  a wrong 
intuition. Couldn't a similar argument be aplied 
to  the  “states”  of  gas  containers?  Which 
information  and  how  can  be  obtained  about 
these  “states”?  For  example,  the  locations  of 
most  molecules  can be determined only up to 
the  dimensions  of  the  container.  Hence,  each 
molecule  of  gas  possessing  a  more  definite  
location  is  a  wrong  intuition?  And,  gas 
consisting of separate molecules is,  perhaps,  a 
correct intuition, but to what extent? 
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